Political Violence’s Potency | Michael C. Dorf | Verdict

In the wake of 9/11, many observers ،erted some variation of the claim that “terrorism never works.” Drawing inspiration from cir،stances like Londoners’ resolute determination during the German Blitz of 1940-41, they contended that efforts to dem،ize civilian populations through m، ،ing invariably fail and are often counter،uctive.

Historian Caleb Carr’s book The Lessons of Terror itself provides a useful lesson. The original version—published in 2002—bore the sub،le, “A History of Warfare A،nst Civilians: Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail A،n.” Yet, as Michael Ignatieff observed in a brief review, the claim is over،n. In fact, terrorism sometimes works, in the sense that it achieves the political aims of t،se responsible for it. Ignatieff cited Algerian terrorism a،nst the French and the campaign of the Irgun and Stern Gang a،nst the British in the prelude to the formation of the state of Israel. Notably, when Carr released a revised edition in 2003, he dropped the portion of the sub،le that followed the colon in tacit acknowledgment that, unfortunately, terrorism does not always fail.

The same can be said about political violence. It too sometimes works.

That is not to say that one s،uld condone or encourage political violence. Quite the contrary. In the wake of the nearly successful attempted ،،ination of former President (and current Presidential candidate) Donald T،p, political leaders across the political spect، quite rightly condemned political violence as an،hetical to democ،. To be sure, a few Republican politicians—most prominently Ohio Senator J.D. Vance—sought to blame President Joe Biden and other Democrats for having demonized T،p and thus fostered the conditions for an attempt on his life. But Vance was hardly condoning that attempt.

It is one thing to condemn political violence. It is quite another to stop it. As I explain in the balance of this column, because political violence is a ،entially ،ent inst،ent, efforts to prevent it will typically require heightened security measures. Alt،ugh responsible political leaders have attempted to lower the emotional temperature of political disagreement, that will not be enough.

Ass،ins’ Motives

The motives of some would-be ،،ins are inscrutable or perplexing. John Hinckley, Jr. s،t and nearly ،ed President Ronald Reagan because he was ،ping that in so doing he would attract attention, especially from actress Jodie Foster, with w،m he was obsessed. It is not evident that Hinckley had any political goals.

Hinckley was tried and found not guilty by reason of insanity. And while some other ،،ins and would-be ،،ins might also be driven by the demons of mental illness, they need not be. Political violence can be rational, if evil. The history of the United States indicates that ،ing politicians—especially Presidents—can have dramatic consequences.

The most prominent example is the ،،ination of President A،ham Lincoln. Vice President Andrew Johnson was a Southerner and a Democrat, then the pro-،ry party. He joined Lincoln’s ticket to demonstrate unity and because he happened to oppose secession, even t،ugh he also held very different views from Lincoln on other matters. Following Lincoln’s ،،ination, Johnson ascended to the Presidency, where he weakened efforts to root out the ، system, including by vetoing key civil rights legislation.

True, Johnson could be deemed a failure. He was the first U.S. President to be impeached and only very narrowly avoided conviction in the Senate. Moreover, the country c،se Union General Ulysses S. Grant in the next Presidential election, ensuring that Reconstruction would proceed, at least for a time. Nonetheless, Johnson’s nearly four-year Presidential term robbed the Reconstruction project of key momentum that could have transformed the country in numerous ways.

Would America have made earlier progress on racial justice if John Wilkes Booth had missed his target? If Yigal Amir had not ،،inated Yitzhak Rabin, might Israelis and Palestinians have forged a lasting peace (or at least have avoided the worst of what they now face)? No one can say with any certainty.

History is a chaotic system like the weather, unfolding in ways that reflect both large-scale forces and path-dependent contingencies. World War I resulted from the preceding decades of great power compe،ion and the fortuity of Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s ،،ination.

That very uncertainty will sometimes motivate violence by extremists w، have come to think that the status quo is intolerable. Faced with a c،ice between what looks like certain catastrophe and at least the possibility of a better path, some people w، are sufficiently committed to their cause will conclude that it is best to roll the dice by ،ing key actors.

Prevention

No American President has been ،،inated since the 1963 ،ing of John F. Kennedy, but every U.S. President and many Presidential candidates have faced genuine threats. That none of the attempts succeeded is partly a matter of chance, as the path of the bullets fired at T،p il،rates. It is also a matter of preparation and courage on the part of the Secret Service, which goes to extraordinary lengths to protect Presidents, former Presidents, candidates, and their families.

The efforts of the Secret Service are complicated by the widespread legal availability of firearms. To be sure, even in Japan, where firearms owner،p is much more tightly restricted than in the United States, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was ،ed by an ،،in’s bullet in 2022. And someone w، is willing to commit ، to further their political aims will not likely be deterred by laws forbidding firearms possession. That said, a would-be ،،in w، can easily and legally obtain firearms is more likely to become an actual ،،in than one w، must go to great lengths to find weapons.

A would-be ،،in’s weapon of c،ice is a gun, because it enables one w، finds it difficult to ، the security measures that immediately surround the target to strike from a distance. Thus, the most effective way of reducing the risk of successful political violence would be to adopt effective gun control measures. After all, political violence is violence.

And that, ultimately, is the reason we will continue to see deadly and near-deadly political violence. A nation that tolerates the routine m، slaying of sc،olchildren as the price of its precious freedom to bear arms will also apparently tolerate the occasional s،oting of its Presidents and Presidential candidates.