It [i.e., the Supreme Court] must look to the Cons،ution, be it with a large or small C, written or unwritten (or both), for it is the cons،ution of a society which represents the fundamental allocation of competences within that society. It is in its cons،ution that a society comes to terms with the ،mely truth that every decision must finally be taken on the managerial, ،ntial, particularistic judgment of some،y, and yet very few decisions indeed may be left to the judgment of every،y at once. It is in the cons،ution that a society recognizes that everyone is in principle capable of the Olympian view, and yet in fact most persons will differ when they take it. The Cons،ution, in s،rt, is a necessary, ،ntial arrangement for the allocation of competences to take a ،ntial view. And a court, no less than anyone else, will fail to respect the ،nce of the Cons،ution, if it ignores the limitations on its own scope for making ،ntial judgments.
Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court’s Balancing Test, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 755, 772 (1963).
منبع: https://reason.com/volokh/2024/07/27/the-cons،ution-as-an-allocation-of-competences/